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THE TREATY OF NICE, NATO AND A EUROPEAN
ARMY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR IRELAND
Andy Storey (Afri), April 2001
Could Ireland Help Change NATO and the ERRF?
State élites are not moral agents. Those who determine NATO
policy do so on the basis of their self-interest and that
of their corporate sponsors, whether they be arms industry
or oil company executives. This makes it highly unlikely
that NATO will promote global peace and security, though
such an outcome is not necessarily rendered impossible.
For example, an argument could be made that, whatever motivations
inspired it, NATO action vis-ŕ-vis Bosnia in 1995 saved
lives and pushed parties towards a settlement. We are not
persuaded: NATO itself inflicted significant damage (including
through the usage of cluster bombs and depleted uranium,
as discussed above), and the settlement arrived at legitimised
and rewarded ethnic cleansing, as well as laying the seeds
for further conflict and partition. Nonetheless, the argument
can be made and needs to be taken seriously.
Following from this, could it, in turn, be argued that closer
and more active Irish participation in NATO and NATO-linked
initiatives could help to enhance potential positive results
i.e., to reform and improve existing policies? The central
difficulty here is that the record of successive Irish governments
on these issues is extremely poor, so the chances of the
current or any future government pushing for progressive
policies seem remote. Irish troops in the ERRF will, as
mentioned earlier, operate in actions dominated by more
powerful contingents from other countries:
"There is thus no question of our persuading them to stop
dropping clusters of 'bomblets' and using uranium-tipped
shells… It is.. highly doubtful that any political leadership
could succeed in participating in such a relationship without
being shifted decisively over time towards NATO's perspectives
and requirements. It is beyond belief that our political
leaders… can be trusted even to try… It is hard to envisage
an Irish government, having been unprepared to state its
principled objection to a whole tranche of policies at the
outset, subsequently objecting to some of them under the
circumstances of an actual crisis and all the pressures
which it would bring".
This last comment may seem unduly cynical, but it is a cynicism
bred by past government actions. A decision on the government's
part to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was taken despite
the fact that the Taoiseach, when in opposition (in March
1996), told the Dáil that joining PfP without a referendum
would be a "serious breach of faith and fundamentally undemocratic".
This commitment to a referendum was restated in the Fianna
Fáil election manifesto of 1997, which ruled out Irish participation
in "NATO-led organisations such as Partnership for Peace".
We are now members of PfP, without benefit of a referendum.
Is it reasonable to expect a government that will so endorse
militarism when under no pressure to do so (and indeed when
having promised not to), will reject it when 'peer pressure'
for participation in ERRF operations is exerted by other EU
members?
In any event, any argument that Ireland could be expected
to promote a progressive agenda through participation in the
new EU security arrangements is undermined by the obsessive
secrecy that surrounds the whole initiative. As reported by
Breda O'Brien, Javier Solana has pushed through measures severely
limiting access to all documents concerning the ERRF, apparently
without any demurral from Irish representatives. Most documents
on the ERRF are inaccessible to parliamentarians, let alone
the general public, contributing to the very limited scope
for democratic oversight of this area that Michael D. Higgins,
amongst others, has highlighted. Any expectation that we might
oblige our government to pursue a progressive agenda by careful
monitoring and lobbying is undermined by these restrictions.
Solana is, apparently, proposing to make things even worse
by ensuring that an even greater number of foreign policy
and security decisions are, in future, made behind closed
doors and in secret. What is all this secrecy about? Denis
Staunton has explained it clearly: "The creation of the rapid
reaction force involves an intensification of the EU's relationship
with NATO, and top brass at NATO headquarters in Brussels
have warned the Commission that any leaks will stop the flow
of sensitive information". And here we are forcefully returned
to one of the central aspects of the matter: NATO, a force
for injustice and instability, is inseparable from the ERRF.
As Andréani et al have stated: NATO "will in practice be an
integral part" of European security and defence policy. That
inseparability is a problem in its own right and is also a
vital indicator of the priorities of EU leaders: even if the
ERRF were a more independent force, as the French government
in particular would wish, it would be unlikely to be a force
for global peace and justice, given the evident taste for
militarism of EU élites.
Introduction
New Military Structures
The Link with NATO
Could Ireland Help Change NATO and the ERRF?
Conclusion
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