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THE TREATY OF NICE, NATO AND A EUROPEAN
ARMY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR IRELAND
Andy Storey (Afri), April 2001
Conclusion
A summary of the arguments so far is as follows.
- The emerging EU security 'architecture' is closely
linked to NATO, which is both a problem in itself and
also an important indication of the militaristic approach
to security issues favoured by EU leaders.
- NATO policies and practices are more likely to promote
insecurity and injustice than peace and equality, and
by extension this applies also to emerging EU security
structures.
- It would be unwise to assume that Irish participation
in NATO or EU security structures will make those policies
and practices any better: the track record of our governments
has been poor on these issues and NATO/EU information
restrictions are such as to undermine the scope for democratic
oversight and accountability.
Another question now arises: would Irish non-participation
in the ERRF help make the world a more peaceful and just place?
Yes it would, if only to the limited extent of reducing by
850 soldiers and some helicopters and armoured personnel carriers
the overall capacity of the ERRF. The Irish government has
already purchased 40 armoured personnel carriers at a cost
of £1 million each, and a further 40 are also likely to be
purchased, along with 80 smaller (so called 'light tactical')
vehicles. The proposed purchase of helicopters (including
2 or 3 'battle-standard' ones) is likely to cost a further
total of £100 million. Not only should we be worried about
the fact that these plans have "attracted unprecedented interest
from the international arms industry", but "whatever Europe
developed on its own [in terms of military equipment and structures]
would be made available to NATO, if and when that alliance
[NATO] needed it". The fact that Ireland is buying weaponry
that will be available for use by NATO should be a cause of
grave concern.
An Irish decision to invest less (or nothing at all) in the
military equipment required for participation in the PfP and
the ERRF would have the benefit of freeing up resources for
investment in, for example, non-militaristic conflict prevention
and resolution activities. But, first, we should follow the
Hippocratic principle as practised by doctors: whatever else
one does, at least 'do no harm'. One element of how Ireland
might institutionalise such a principle is to adopt a version
of the Danish protocol to the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties,
and to which Denmark drew attention in relation to the Nice
Summit Presidency report (see above). This protocol states:
"With regard to measures adopted by the Council in the field
of Articles [of the Amsterdam Treaty], Denmark does not participate
in the elaboration and the implementation of decisions and
actions of the Union which have defence implications, but
will not prevent the development of closer cooperation between
member states in this area. Therefore Denmark shall not participate
in their adoption. Denmark shall not contribute to the financing
of the operational expenditure arising from such measures."
We can and should vote against the Nice Treaty and state that
we are doing so the grounds that we are opposed to the militarisation
of the EU and to enhanced partnership with NATO. If, as we
hope, the Treaty is rejected in a referendum, we call on the
government to add a Danish-type protocol to the renegotiated
Treaty before bringing it back to the Irish people. The Treaty
of Nice will only come into effect when it is ratified by
all 15 member states of the EU. The ratification process is
only intended to be complete before the end of the year 2002.
Rejection of the Treaty in a referendum in Ireland does not,
therefore, spell the end of the Treaty. There remains ample
time for re-negotiation and, in particular, for insertion
of a Danish-type protocol to safeguard Irish concerns in the
defence and security area.
Even more importantly, rejection of the Treaty by referendum
would send a valuable warning message to Irish and EU policy-makers
concerning the development of defence and security policies
and structures. To date, these developments have largely been
undertaken in secret. Even supporters of EU militarisation
acknowledge that "The newly-established defence and security
policy… has not been submitted to the full-scale public debate
which it merits". The upcoming referendum is, as mentioned
at the outset, an opportunity to initiate such a debate, and
a no vote would provide an opportunity for this debate to
be extended to look at possible alternatives to existing policies.
In broad terms, those alternatives should involve the promotion
of non-violent conflict prevention and resolution actions
through a range of fora, including non-governmental organisations
and intergovernmental bodies such as the Organisation for
Security and Co-operation in Europe and the United Nations.
This, in turn, demands a commitment to serious reform of those
organisations to ensure that they function with greater effectiveness
than heretofore. (What is not needed is the present trend
of bypassing and marginalising the UN and then pointing to
its alleged ineffectiveness as an excuse for resorting to
alternative channels - such as NATO). Irish diplomatic skills,
already well established, as well as those peacekeeping skills
already honed by Irish soldiers - what the Taoiseach has termed
"Ireland's distinctive role in UN peacekeeping" - would be
drawn upon for these purposes rather than a military prowess
that can only be attained at considerable cost and deployed
to probably destructive ends.
The supporters of the Treaty of Nice claim that it is necessary
to facilitate the process of EU enlargement. But enlargement
- the inviting of others to join the grouping of which we
are members - imposes certain obligations upon us. One is
that we take care to ensure the house into which new members
are being invited is genuinely secure. To halt the insecurity-inducing
trend of current policies, and to begin the process of promoting
genuine security through greater attention to conflict prevention
and peace-building activities, would be a greater service
to prospective new EU members than would unthinking ratification
of the Treaty of Nice.
For further information, contact afri@iol.ie,
or telephone 01 882 7563 / 7581
Introduction
New Military Structures
The Link with NATO
Could Ireland Help Change
NATO and the ERRF?
Conclusion
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